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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
B!\L'Ti\ZAR ANTILLON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Supreme Court No. 19338 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petition for Writ of Review was granted to appeal the 
decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of 
Otah, whie:h terminated and denied the Appellant unemployment 
benefits based on §§35-4-5 (e) and 35-4-5 (k) (1), Utah Code Ann. 
11981 Supplement). 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BELOW 
Appellant's benefits were terminated December 25, 1982. 
~hearing was held before a Department Representative on February 
?3, 1983. The Representative sustained the termination of 
nPnef its in a decision issued March 15, 1983, which allowed the 
~ppe 11 ant 10 days to appeal. 
Appellant filed his appeal March 22, 1983, and an 
administrative hearing was held before Eugene D. Wright, Appeals 
Referee in Price, Utah, April 12' 1983. The Appeals Referee 
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affirmed the decision of the Department representative 
specifically found the Appellant ineligible for benefits based 
§35-4-5 (e) and §35-4-5 (k) (1), Utah Code Ann. (1981 Supplement) 
The Appellant appealed the decision to the Boe.rd 
0
_ 
Review on April 28, 1983. The Board of Review affirmed ch 
decision of the Appeals Referee in a decision dated July 
1983. The Appellant then filed a timely Petition for Writ c 
Review in this Court on July 26, 1983. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests reversal of the decision of the 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department 
of Employment Security, terminating his benefits and finding hi,, 
ineligible. Appellant also requests reinstatement of those 
benefits. 
Mexico. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Baltazar Antillon, is a citizen cf 
He has permanently resided in the United States since 
1971 (R. 0034), with brief vacations to Mexico. It was on the 
last of these vacations to Mexico, in July of 1980 that Mr. 
Antillon filed papers in Mexico to legitimize his status in the 
United States (R. 0035, 0037). On January 30, 1981, the 
Appellant voluntarily went to the Immigration and Naturalizaticn 
Service (INS) in Salt Lake City to determine his immigrant status 
in the United States (R. 0033). At that time he was issued ar. 
I-94 Arrival and Departure document which indicated that he '''"-
in the United States with the knowledge of the INS, and unce' 
docket control by the Salt Lake INS office (R. 00571. Appellant 
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,as also issued a Notice of Voluntary Departure (R. 0056) 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §245.5 (2) (iii), which provided no penalty 
for failure to depart (R. 0033). 
Instead of leaving the United States, Appellant 
remained in the country in an attempt to legitimize his status to 
that of legal permanent resident. He hired an immigration 
atturney who informed him that he was entitled to apply for 
suspension of Deportation (§3244 Immigration and Nationality Act, 
U,S.C. §1254) and, through that process, become a legal 
permanent resident of the United States. The Appellant notified 
the INS of his intention to remain in the United States pending 
final adJudication of his status by filing an Application for 
Suspension of Deportation on August 4, 1981 (R. 0054, 0055). 
Subsequent to the filing of this application, the INS issued an 
Order to Show Cause (R. 0051) against the Appellant on September 
10, 1981, which initiated deportation proceedings (8 C.F.R. 
§242. 1). The Order to Show Cause informed the Appellant of his 
procedural due process rights and set a date for the hearing, on 
the veracity of the allegations, on a "date to be determined." 
(R, 0052, 0051). 
Appellant testified that no action by the INS had 
occurred subsequent to the fall of 1981 (R. 0039). He has not 
had a hearing before an immigration judge (R. 0038) nor has any 
act c0n been taken on his application for Suspension of 
Deprirtation (R. 0039). 
After applying for papers in Mexico, informing the INS 
:·i his presence in the United States and receiving an I-94 
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document, the Appellant believed that there had been a change 
his status in the United States which made him el igiblc ·~i 
benefits (R. 0037). Prior to his contact with the INS, Appel l
3
n'. 
understood he was not entitled to benefits and therefore, 
never applied, even though he had had periods of unemployment IR. 
0037). 
Appellant applied for and received unemployrnen1 
compensation benefits for the weeks ended January 10, 1981, 
through January 31, 1981, and from July 17, 1982, to July 24, 
1982; October 30, 1982, through December 25, 1982. His benefits 
were terminated on December 2 5, 19 82. At his hearing on April 
12, 1983, the Appellant objected to the use of, and reliance on, 
the hearsay evidence of the INS (R. 0029, 0030). His objection 
was overruled (R. 0030), and he was subsequently disqualified for 
49 week period beginning March 20, 1983, and ending February 25, 
1984, and found to have received an overpayment liability in ~e 
amount of $4,220.00, twice the amount he received (R. 0004). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT ESTABLISHED HIS ELIGIBILITY FOR 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS UNDER SECTION 35-4-5(k), UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1981 SUPPLEMENT), AS A PERSON 
PERMANENTLY RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
COLOR OF LAW. 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. §35-4-5(k) PROVIDES THREE 
CATEGORIES OF ALIENS ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE 
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
The Appellant was found to be ineligible u 11 "' 
§35-4-5 (k), Utah Code Ann. (1981 Supplement) which provides thal: 
An individual shall be ineligible 
for benefits or for purposes of 
establishing a waiting period: 
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(k) ( 1) For any week in which 
the benefits are based upon 
services performed by an alien 
unless such alien is an individual 
who has been lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence at the time 
such services were performed, was 
lawfully present for purposes of 
performing such services or, was 
permanently residing in the United 
States under color of law at the 
time such services were performed 
(including an alien who is lawfully 
present in the United States as a 
result of the application of the 
provision of section 203 (a) (7) or 
section 212 (d) (5) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act). 
(Emphasis added). The statute establishes three distinct 
exceptions to ineligibility. Respondents, in their decision in 
this case acknowledge eligibility based only on the first two 
categories: when an alien is lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence or lawfully admitted for performing the services (as 
demonstrated by a work authorization permit issued by the INS). 
The third and completely ignored category includes those aliens 
"permanently residing in the United States under color of law." 
The meaning of the phrase "permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law" must be examined in terms of 
case law and the Immigration and Naturalization Act. Since the 
Ptah statute is identical to Federal law, 26 U.S.C. §3304(14) (A), 
and neither attempts to limit the phrase "under color of law," it 
shnuld be accorded a fluid meaning consistent with its historical 
leg a I significance with an eye toward the relationship of the 
•lien ctnd his status in the United States. 
The starting point for analysis is examining the 
meiln1ng of "color of law". It has frequently been said that 
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color of law does not mean actual law. "'Color' as a modi fiei 
legal parlance means 'appearance as distinguished from real1t 
Color of law means mere semblance of legal right." McCain --
City of Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 175 (1889). 
B. WHEN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 
SERVICE IS AWARE OF A PERSON'S STATUS AND DOES 
NOT ATTEMPT TO EFFECTUATE DEPORTATION, THAT 
PERSON IS RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER 
COLOR OF LAW. 
In Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845 (2nd Cir. )97; 
cert. denied Shang v. U.S., 435 U.S. 947 (1978) the w;r 
construed the phrase "permanently residing in the United StatE 
under color of law" which was used in the eligibility criteria:' 
the New York State Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFD: 
plan. In construing "under color of law" the court stated: 
The phrase obviously includes 
actions not covered by specific 
authorization of law. It embraces 
not only situations within the body 
of the law, but also others 
enfolded by a colorable invitation. 
"Under color of law" means that 
which an official does by virtue of 
power, as well as what he does by 
virtue of right. The phrase 
encircles the law, its shadows, and 
its penumbra. When an admini-
strative agency or legislative body 
uses the phrase "under color of 
law" it deliberately sanctions the 
use of cases that are, in strict 
terms, outside the law, but are 
near the boarder. 
Id. at 849-950. See also Matter of Papadopoulos v. Shan_'.!, 
N.Y.S.2d 152, 155 (1979); St. Francis Hospital v. D'Elia, "·· 
N. Y .S.2d 104, 109 (1979). 
- 6 -
In Berger v. Department of Health Education and 
Civil Action No. 76 c 1420 (1978), the Federal District 
cf"rt fur the Eastern District of New York gave its approval to 
consent Judgment regarding eligibility for Supplemental 
security Income benefits which included as persons permanently 
residing in the United States under color of law "any alien 
residing in the United States with the knowledge and permission 
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and whose departure 
from the United States the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
does not contemplate enforcing." (Final judgment attached as 
Appendix 1) . 
The court in Papadopoulos, supra, determined that the 
petitioner was in the United States under color of law while her 
opplication for adjustment of status was pending before the 
Irrmigration and Naturalization Service. In Papadopoulos, the 
petitioner entered the United States on a non-immigrant visa on 
August 16, 1975, and 12 days later she applied to the INS for a 
change of status to that of permanent resident. She had a stroke 
Pebruary 2, 1976, while her application before the INS was still 
pending. Applications for nursing home care were approved in May 
1976 and June 1976. Her application before the INS was denied on 
December 15, 1976, and the denial was on review at the time the 
-c~rt heard the case. The court determined that denial of 
Medicaid was inappropriate since the petitioner was in the United 
5tates "under color of law" during any "period subsequent to the 
final denial of her application for adjustment of status to 
permanent resident and while she was awaiting a ruling on whether 
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or not she would be granted deferred status for humanitar 
reasons." Id. at 155 (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, the standards of Holley as applw 
in Papadopoulos support a finding that the Appellant is and ,,a,, 
at the time he filed and received unemployment compensatic, 
benefits, permanently residing in the United States under color 
of law within the meaning of §35-4-5 (k). As in Papadopoulos, tc,, 
Appellant in this case voluntarily contacted the INS to attain ar 
adjustment of status to permanent resident. When he contacte' 
the INS they issued an I-94 form, an identification form issued 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §264.1. This form identifies the alien asa 
person who is under docket control of the INS. Aliens are 
required to carry this documentation at all times. Failure to 
have those documents is a punishable offense under 8 U.S.C. 
§1304 (e). 
Appellant rightfully understood this as a change frorr, 
his previous status in the United States (R. 0037). He continued 
to keep the INS informed of his presence in the United States and 
has not been deported. In fact, he did not hear from the INS 
again until after he filed for Suspension of Deportation 1c 
August of 1981 (R. 0055). Then on September 10, 1981, an Order 
to Show Cause alleging a basis for deportation was issued (R. 
0051). The veracity of these allegations has never been prover' 
by the INS in a deportation hearing. The Appellant remains l" 
the United States with the knowledge and permission of the 
until these allegations are proven and his Application 
1 
Suspension of Deportation is finally denied or granted. 
- 8 -
the Appellant is in the same condition that Mrs. Papadopoulos was 
while she was waiting for the INS to act on her application. As 
lhe court noted there she was "under color of law pending a final 
ienial of her applications and deferred status." 
The relief that Appellant seeks under the Immigration 
and Nationality Act, in the form of Suspension of Deportation, is 
similar in nature to the relief which was sought in 
2 
Papadopoulos. Throughout the period of his dealings with the 
INS, no efforts beyond the initiation of deportation proceedings 
through the issuance of an Order to Show Cause have been made by 
the INS to effect a final deportation. The hearing date to 
determine the veracity of these allegations is still to be set on 
a "date to be determined." (R. 0051) All of this impels the 
conclusion that Baltazar Antillon is "permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law" and thus, is entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits under §35-4-5 (k) (1), Utah Code 
Ann. (1981 Supplement). 
The right of an individual to remain in the United States 
pending final adjudication of his status is indicated by 
8 U.S.C.A. §1252 (e) (1983 Supplement) which penalizes an 
alien for failure to depart the country "within a period 
of six months from the date of the final order of 
deportation under administrative processes, or, if 
Jnd1cial review is had, then from the date of the final 
order of the court .... " 
Suspension of Deportation is a discretionary form of 
relief from deportation under the Immigration laws, 8 
ll.S.C.A. §1254. This form of relief is also recognized 
in 8 U.S.C.A. §1252 (e) (6), as relief which a court could 
recognize to allow an alien to remain in the United 
States. 
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C. A RELATIONSHIP MAY BE PERMANENT EVEN 
THOUGH IT IS ONE THAT MAY BE CHANCED 
EVENTUALLY AT THE INSTANCE OF EITHER THE 
UNITED STATES OR THE INDIVIDUAL. 
Since in the phrase "permanently residing in the u~lts. 
States under color of law" reference is being made to an ali~r<, 
immigration status, the definition found in the Immigration ar:: 
Nationality Act is helpful in explaining the meaning of b, 
terms. In regards to the word "permanent" the Immigration an,: 
Nationality Act states in 8 U.S.C. §1101 (a) (31): 
The term "permanent" means a 
relationship of continuing or 
lasting nature, as distinguished 
from temporary, but a relationship 
may be permanent even though it is 
one that may be dissolved even-
tually at the instance of either 
the United States or of the 
individual, in accordance with law. 
See also: Holley v. Lavine, supra, at 850. 
The statutory definition of the adjective "permanent" 
aids in the interpretation of the adverb "permanently" when 
construing the phrase "permanently residing in the United States 
under color of law". 
Moreover, the above federal statutory definition is 
consistent with categories of persons qualifying as "permanent]; 
residing .•. under color of law" in §35-4-5(k). For example, under 
8 U.S.C. §1153 (a) (7), a refugee is only permitted conditiona; 
entry pursuant to regulations of the Attorney General, wri;,, 
under 8 U.S.C. §1182, an alien may be paroled temporarily 1 ',: 
the United States at the direction of the Attorney General evs·: 
though they are otherwise inadmissible. Thus, the two examples 
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are instances where an alien is permitted to stay in the United 
s;ates not necessarily forever, but only so long as he/she is in 
,, particular condition, Holley v. Lavine, supra at 851. While in 
that particular condition the alien is permanently residing in 
the United States. 
The Appellant in this case has an ongoing relationship 
with the INS in which he is attempting to legitimize his 
immigrant status to that of legal permanent resident through 
Suspension of Deportation. So long as INS allows him to reside 
ln the United States to pursue his claim to permanent residency, 
he should be recognized as a person permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS SINCE THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
TERMINATE HIS UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS. 
A. THE DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY A PREPON-
DERANCE OF EVIDENCE. 
Regardless of whether or not Appellant is found to be 
residing in the United States under color of law, he is 
nonetheless entitled to the benefits that he has received since 
the Respondents failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Appellant was an ineligible alien at the time he 
filed for and received unemployment compensation benefits. The 
ci' o,gu;i 1 if i cation provisions of §35-4-5 (k) ( 3) specifically provide 
c_hat, 
( 3) In the case of an indi-
vidual whose application for 
benefits would otherwise be 
approved, no determination that 
- 11 -
benefits to such individual are not 
payable because of his alien status 
shall be made except upon a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
(Emphasis added) . This requires the Respondent to demonstra~, 
that a preponderance of the evidence substantiates ineligibi ht 
at the time the claim for benefits was made. In the prescr,,_ 
case, there is nothing in the record that substantiate a deter-
mination of ineligibility at the time Appellant applied for ace 
received unemployment benefits. The evidence, which is total], 
hearsay, establishes questions about the Appellant's status prio'. 
to filing for unemployment benefits, but it does not suppolt, 
factual finding of illegal status at the time he applied for 
benefits. The testimony of the Appellant establishes that he is 
a citizen of Mexico. This in and of itself is not sufficient tc 
disqualify the Appellant or demonstrate that when he applied for 
unemployment benefits he was an ineligible alien. 
the 
B. HEARSAY ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE 
DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW. 
The Respondents base their denial of benefits solely on 
hearsay evidence provided by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service. In Sandy State Bank v. Brimhall, 636 
P.2d 481 at 486 (Utah 1981), this Court stated the rule regarding 
use of hearsay in administrative proceedings: 
The Court has long recognized the 
considerable differences that exist 
between court trials and proceed-
ings before administrative 
agencies, and that the technical 
rules of evidence need not be 
applied in the latter. The Court 
has also held that hearsay evidence 
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is admissible in proceedings before 
the Industrial Commission and the 
Public Service Commission. 
However, a finding of fact cannot 
be based solely on hearsay 
evidence, but must be supported by 
a residuum of legal evidence 
competent in a court of law. 
!Footnotes omitted, emphasis added). See also: Ogden Iron Works 
v. Industrial Commission, 702 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376, 379 (1942). 
The decision of the Respondents in the present case was 
based solely upon the hearsay statements of the INS. The 
Respondents relied upon documents of the INS which were admitted 
over objection by the Appellant (R. 0029, 0030), as being 
hearsay. The Appeals Referee acknowledged the existence of 
hearsay, but overruled the objection and admitted the evidence 
(R. 0030). 
The prejudicial effect of relying solely on the hearsay 
evidence in the present case is demonstrated by the void in the 
record created due Appellant's lack of opportunity to confront 
the INS about the relevance of the various documents in 
establishing Appellant's immigration status in the United States. 
One document relied upon by the Department Representative (R. 
0039) blatantly states that the Appellant is in the country 
"illegally" without stating why or under what law the determin-
dtion was made. Furthermore, the documents of the INS failed to 
~stablish the qualifications of the individuals making statements 
of the Appellant's status in the country. 
The Respondents cannot base their decision solely on 
the rr1or decision of the Department. The Board of Review must 
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examine the record and find competent evidence support 
findings of fact. Philadelphia Transportation Compan_;c _ _::; 
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 196 Pa.Super. 1, 
(1958). The record in this case does not support the exist,,,, 
of even a "residuum of legal evidence" which would be "competer.-
in a court of law. Thus, the Respondent's decision cannot star 
since it is not supported by competent evidence nor substantia~ 
by a preponderance of evidence. The only evidence produced t. 
the Respondent in support of its decision was the hearsi 
document of Mr. Donald Whitney (R. 0049) and the Order to She,. 
Cause (R. 0051) which merely alleges that the Appellant 1 
illegally present in the United States. The function of an Orde_ 
to Show Cause was spelled out in Chlomos v. U.S. Dept. of Justk 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 516 F.2d 310, 312 FN. 
(1975) which stated: 
1. An order to show cause should 
contain a concise statement of the 
violation and a designation of the 
charges against the alien. It is 
comparable to an indictment in a 
criminal proceeding or a complaint 
in a civil action. See 1 Gordon 
and Rosenfield, Immi ration Law and 
Procedure, §5.S et ~· Rev.ed. 
1974) . 
The Appeals Referee stated that in regard to tfi 
Appellant's immigration status: "As near as I can determine 
everything in this case is pending." This is the only c 
finding of fact which is supported by the testimony evic 2: 
presented at the Appellant's hearing. For these reasons, -· 
decision of the Board of Review should be reversed ar: 
Appellant's unemployment benefits should be reinstated. 
- 14 -
POINT III. 
THE APPELLANT DID NOT WILLFULLY OR KNOWINGLY 
ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS HE WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO. 
If this Court should find that the Appellant is not 
permanently residing in the United States under color of law 
within the meaning of the unemployment statute, and that the 
decision of the Board of Review is substantiated by a residuum of 
legally competent evidence, it will be necessary to determine 
whether the Appellant willfully made a false statement in order 
to obtain benefits he was not entitled to. The Appellant was 
found to be ineligible for benefits based on §35-4-5 (k) and 
§35-4-5 (e), Utah Code Ann. (1981 Supplement). Section 35-4-5 (e) 
provides in relevant part: 
An individual shall be ineligible 
for benefits or for purposes of 
establishing a waiting period: 
(e) For each week with respect 
to which the claimant willfully 
made a false statement or represen-
tation or knowingly failed to 
report a material fact to obtain 
any benefit under the provisions of 
this act, and an additional 13 
weeks for the first week the 
statement or representation was 
made or fact withheld and six weeks 
for each week thereafter; such 
additional weeks not to exceed 49 
weeks •.•. 
Determinations under this 
subsection shall be made only upon 
a sworn written admission of the 
claimant or after due notice and 
recorded hearing. If a claimant 
waives the recorded hearing a 
determination shall be made based 
upon all the facts which the 
commission, exercising due dili-
gence, has obtained. Determin-
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ations by the commission shall be 
appealable in the manner provided 
by this act for appeals from other 
benefit determinations. (emphasis 
added) 
In Taylor v. Department of Employment Securit_L, 
P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1982), this Court affirmed the position of~ 
v. Board of Review, 572 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 1977) which state' 
The intention to defraud is 
by the [unemployment] claims 
selves which contain 
statements and fail to set 
shown 
them-
f al se 
forth 
material facts required by statute. 
The filing of such claims evidences 
a purpose or willingness to present 
a false claim in order to obtain 
unlawful benefits and hence are 
manifestations of intent to 
defraud. 
Applying this standard to the facts of the present cas' 
there must be a distinction between supplying incorrect factua_ 
information and understanding a nebulous legal concept. For ;~ 
Taylor and Mineer the claimants were citizens of the Unitec 
States who knew and understood the applications that they were 
filling out. In contrast, in this case the Appellant ,s ' 
Mexican citizen who speaks, reads and writes English as a seconc 
language. "Willful," for purposes of obtaining unemploymen'. 
benefits, has been defined as knowingly making a false statement. 
Petty v. Commissioner of Labor, 456 N.Y.S.2d 181 (App.Div. 198cl. 
In Ault v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 398 
250, 157 A.2d 375 (1960), the court made it clear that 
appellant was entitled to the presumption of innocence set fon 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Slochower v. Board of Hi~_: 
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Fclucation, 350 U.S. 551 ( 1956) . This presumption must be 
,,,1encorne by more than mere "suspicion and imputation." Id. at 
,54, As applied to the present case, this means that the 
Appellant cannot be found to have made a false or willful 
rusrepresentation without a demonstration that the Appellant 
answered questions in a manner which he knew to be incorrect and 
for the sole purpose of obtaining benefits to which he was not 
entitled 
Case law establishes that a claimant cannot be said to 
have made a willfully false statement where that statement was 
made "accidentally because of negligence, misunderstanding, or 
other cause." Meyer v. Skyline Mobile Homes, 589 P.2d 89 (Idaho 
1979) (Emphasis added). See also United States v. Steinhilber, 
484 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1973). The only evidence presented was 
the testimony of the Appellant in which he stated that he that he 
understood the question, "Are you a United States Citizen? Yes -
No" to mean do you have a right to be in the United States. (R. 
0038), His testimony was that he: 
... "didn't check 'no' because I had 
my papers through the Immigration 
Service, and they didn't say I was 
-- what if I were not.... I (was) 
[sic] believed that I was allowed 
to -- to get benefits." 
The good faith belief of the Appellant, and his minimal 
w1derstanding of the forms which he was filling out distinguishes 
n, is case from other Utah cases which summarily find an error on 
tt1e claim card to be fraud. This misunderstanding of the 
~uest ion and Appellant's response is further supported by the 
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fact that the Appellant never applied for bene:'its po,, 
establishing contact with the INS in an at tempt to c lari f•" 
status even though he had been unemployed (R. 0037). 
The record indicates a misunderstanding on the part : 
the Appellant, but does not support a willful or frauduk 
intent in his actions. The Appellant admits that upon discove, 
of the alleged overpayment he realized that he had improre: 
filled out the form. But at the time he filled out the paper; 
he thought his filing of Immigration papers made it wrong for c; 
to say that he wasn't a citizen. In his mind "no" did not app:C 
because he had his "papers through the Immigration an,, 
Naturalization Service." Seen in this light as applied to t~!' 
Appellant, the requisite state of mind with the purpose c: 
obtaining benefits to which he was not entitled does not exist, 
Therefore, if this Court should find the Appellant ineligible, ce 
should only be required to repay those sums to which he was nee 
entitled. He should not be required to pay twice the amount or 
be penalized for 49 weeks. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant raises three basis upon which the 
decision of the Respondent should be reversed. First, that ~ 1 ' 
entitled to benefits under the third category of aliens elig1o!c 
to receive unemployment benefits, aliens "under color of la•/ 
which was ignored by the Board of Review. This eligibility ~, 
the technical statement of citizenship a non-material L ssue 
justifies reversal and reinstatement of Appellant's unemploymei,' 
benefits. 
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Second, should Appellant not be found within the color 
,r law category, the Board of Review nonetheless failed to prove 
'" s ineligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. The Board 
CH Review re lied upon the decision of the Appeals Referee and 
failed to determine whether a residuum of legally competent 
evidence, aside from hearsay supported the finding below. 
Finally, if Appellant is found ineligible and the 
decision is supported by legally competent evidence, the Appel-
lant' s maximum liability should be the sum which he received. 
Since he did not understand that his marking the citizenship box 
"yes" was incorrect. This action does not support a willful and 
knowingly false statement to obtain benefits to which he was not 
entitled, 
DATED this 30th day of September 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed first-class posta,1, 
prepaid to the following: 
Flovd G. Astin 
K. Allen Zabel 
Special Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
174 Social Hall Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
DATED this j'h day of September, 1983. 
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APPENDIX I 
MANNY BERGER 
v. 
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION 
AND WELFARE, AND THE UNITED 
STATE OF AMERICA 
\ 
..... ~r9 ST!',,.E:S !HST~ICT C0 1Jl1'f 
:.;::~.nrs,~ICT o~ H£W YOUK 
;_,11 J ~a.,, 
----------------------------------------/: 
··~NNY DERGER, on behalf of himself an<l 
~Jll ot>iers si~ilarly situated'. \=\kd 
Plaintiff, 
Ju"\>.. \"':,/ti~ 
- ayainst -
s~CRSThRY OF TH~ UNITED STATES 
[JL.rhR'fi'tt:NT Or JIEJ\LTH, EDuCATION J\ND 
\~LFAflE, J\ND THE UNITED STATES OF 
N\ERICJ\, 
Def end ants. 
------------------~----~--------------------------x 
Prior to final judicial findings of fact and 
CIVIL ACTION 
No" 76 C 1"20 
:t'INAL JUD;:;ViEI.\ 
of law and prior to the certification of this action as a 
class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the parties, by their respective attorneys, 
having presented for judicial approval pursuant to Rule 
23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the within 
Stipulation of Consent to the.Entry of Judgment; and 
This Court having satisfied itself as to the fairness, 
adequacy and propriety of the proposed Fin~l Judgment; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that uithout 
"'mission or eidjudico;tion of la1v ·or fact her:o~in, the Stipulation 
of Consent to the Entry of Judgment annexed hereto is the 
judgment of this Court. 
( \ ,.-, 
lT 1 s STIPllLl\Tt.~ l\lW J\GRECO by ancJ bct,1e the attorneys 
for tl1e respective parties herein that: 
1.. Plaintiff Hz>.nny l:ler9er, <in ;:ilic.::-. rc:;iclir.s in t~c 
United .States U!'lue::: wn order of supervision issued pursccc 
to a u.s.C. !)1252(d), is ;:in al'icn p2rr.1anently rcsicJing ir, 
the un5ted States und~r color of law pursuant to ~2 u.s.r 
5l3S2c (a) (1) (D) (ii) <.incl has been cletermincd to be entitk 
to Supplemental Security IP.come (SSI) b~ne:its; anc] the 
defendant Secretary will continue to provide plaintiff 
Berger with monthly SSI payments for as long as his ir.\;;iis: 
status remains that of an alieri. permanently resic1ing in~;, 
United States under color of law and he remains otherwise 
eligible for benefits. 
2. Proposed intervenor Er..ma Mena, an alien \-1ho is :;, 
beneficia:-y of an immediate re·lati-v·e irrunigrant visa peti:: 
a!!d_ thus has been afforded indefinite voluntary departure: 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service pursuant to 
Operations Instruction 242.10.(a)_ (6) (i) ii is an alien pern2ne· 
. residing in the· United States under color of law p_ursuc.nt: 
U.S.C. §1382c (a) (1) (B) (ii) since at le<1st December 1, 197c 
the defendant Se<;:retary, provided proposed int~rvenor l-ler« 
:raeets all other· eligibility requirements, \-rill provide pre; 
intervenor Mena with monthly SSI payr.ie:-its for as lcng c.s \' 
i.n>;nigration status remains that of· an alien permar.en':ly 
residing in the United States under color or law and she 
remains otherwise eligible for benefits. 
3. Aliens ·who are permanently resicling ·in the Unite: 
States under color of law and who may l:.e eligible for Su?i· 
Security Income benefits include, but are not limited__!:9.: 
(1} .aliens admit~ed to the United States purzua:-.t to a 
u.s.c §ll53(a) (7); (2) aliens paroled into the United 
states pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 51182 (d) (5); ar.d (3) aliens 
residing in the United States pursuant to an order of SU?ervisior 
indefinite stay of ~eportation or inde!inite voluntary · 
t:q~rturc. J\ny othc,rejicn rcr.1u insr in the un.v-s,cl St.iltcs 
/le;tllr,ol i0<c:ition Service '-'n~ \;ho::;c departure from the Unite~ 
Stutes the Ir.unigration <ind N<ituralizzi_tion Service -does n~ 
contcinpl;1te enforcing is <ilso P·?rmancntly residing in the 
unitecJ States under col.or of lilH <ind m<iy be eligib:l:e· 
£or Su;:>plc1oental Security Income.benefits. 
~- Defendant Secretary und his employees and ugcnts 1) 
rn3intain that they have in the past made and 2) sh<ill in the 
future make individualized determinzitions of all appli-
cations by aliens for Supplernental Security Income benefits 
and, specif~cally, defendant Secretary·and his employees and 
agents (1) maintain that they have in the past and (2) shall 
in the future make individualized determinations ·in all 
cases as to \-1hether an alien is permanently residing in the 
United States under color of law pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1382c(a) ( 
(B) Iii), and where it is determined that the alien ii ineligible 
i ur ssr benefits because he or she is neither lawfully 
'-'d"1 tted for permanent residence_ nor otherwise permanently 
'esiding in the United States under color of law, the notice 
<ienying benefits shall specifically state th2.t t.he alien is 
found not to be perr.ianently residing in the United States 
under color of law. 
5. ··Defendant Secretary and his em_oloyees and agents 
shall take all steps necessary to ensure that this order., 
carried out by the employees of the Social Security ,\dmin-
istration and that all aliens \1ho apply for SSI, Hho are 
determined to be permanently:re~iding in the United States 
under color of law and ~ho are othen1ise eligible for 
Supplemental Security Income are awarded and provided with 
SSI benefits. 
6. Defendant Secretary agrees to pro~ulgate a new 
notice in cases of denial or suspension of assistance, to be 
.sent t.o Supplemental Security Income a,?plicants or recipie~.'.. 
'•. t.hat i!; intC?nc.1e~ to norm the i.lpplic<in t or '-..·~p~ent thilt 
.·t.~e: requirements of lj2 U.S.C. §1302c(a) (1) (D) (ii) k1ve not --· hP.cn met. These notices are annexec1 <:is· Exhibits J\. · anc1 B t; 
thi::: stipu~ation .. 
. 7. J\.ll recipients of or a~plicant~ for Supplement2l 
Security Income benefits wh~. since. August 24, 1976, hilve 
rccei~ed or receive notices which informed or inform thN 
th<!t they Here or ore ineligible for SSI benefits becLJ.use 
they Here not United States citizens or legally admitt~ 
aliens, but do or did not inform them that their status 2s 
aliens .. permanently residing in the United States unc1e:r col: 
of law rr.ay entitle the:n to benefits shall be provided in:r. 
the written notice annexed hereto as Exhibit C. 
of 
8. Each of the recipients/ or applicants for SSI be:e 
described in paragraph 7 above shall be entitled, upon 
request, to a review of the Socia·l Security AdministrLJ.ticr.'. 
previous "'ecision on his or her SSI cla:i,m for the purpose c: 
establishing \-1hether he or she is and ha·s been perP.lanently 
residing in the United States ~nder color of law. ~Any 
~PtEr~ination made pursuant to such review shall be subject 
to all of the rights granted by the Social· Security Act =c:i 
JPgulations promulgated thereunder for review of an initial 
c'e~errctination. Defendant Secretary an..1 his employees and 
2 gents shall pay any such individual who establishes his or 
her color of law status and is otherwise eligible SSI 
benefits retroactive·to the date of his or her initial 
2 pplication/suspension, or to the date that is established. 
2 s the time that he or she first ~et or meets the color of 
12w conditions, whichever date is later. 
9. The entry of this judgr;ient shall be without pre-
judice to the rights of absent class members, if any. 
10. The terr.is of this judg~ent shall bind the defendant 
2nd his successors in office, their officers, agents, servants, 
c;-iployecs ancl attorneys, iJnc) those persons in <-ictivc COnC·~rt 
,,r p<irtici!J.:il:ion w.ith the;n "ho rccci·_.c actu;::il notice of th~s 
jullyMerit oy per::;un<tl ::;8.i: v.ice: oi: otJ-.cr1-:i::;c. 
11. Nothing contained in_this judgment shall consti~ute 
''" acljucl'.cation or concession \lith respect to the validity, 
uoJer the Constitution.or any federal law or regulation, 
c• 1 ~ny policy, pi:actice or procedure of the clcfeT1clants. 
· 12. This Court retains jurisdiction over this <:iction 
for the purpose of issuing any orders \·Jhich !<lay be neces'.'. 
for the construction, implementation or enforcement of thi: 
judgment o~ of any of the provisions thereof. 
Dated: New York, New York 
June ~ 1978 
KALMAN FINKEL 
Attorney-in-Charge 
The Legar Aid society 
Civil Division 
JOHN E. KIRKLIN 
Director· of Litigation 
ARTHUR J. FRIED, Of Coe:.: 
The Legal· Aid Society 
Civil Appeals & LaH Refc: 
11 Park Place -. 8th Floo 
New York, new York ·1001: 
(212) 227-2755 
NORTON B. DICKER 
The ~egal Aid Socie~ 
11 Park Place 
New York, New York 100'.' 
(212) 227-2755 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
-~-,,.--------
SO ORDERED: 
U/WlD <1. 7//'11tn 
Unitc<l St~ s ~ttorncy fo: 
the E~~~c=~ Di~trict of 
New Yod: 
225 Caomun Pl~za E~st 
~=ooklyn, ~c~ Yo:k 11201 
Attorney for Defendants 
By s ~ C. s:;;JD 
ROGER FIE !:'> 
Assistant nited States 
Attorney 
CHARLES P. SIFTON ~ 
United States District judge 
Dated: 1.)1'\~ · \'-\ \'\""\~ 
~(OQ\.\1". }J'{. 
Judgment entered: 
Clerk 
